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Abstract
We analyze a controlled price formation experiment in the laboratory that shows evidence for
bubbles. We calibrate two models that demonstrate with high statistical significance that these
laboratory bubbles have a tendency to grow faster than exponential due to positive feedback. We
show that the positive feedback operates by traders continuously upgrading their over-optimistic
expectations of future returns based on past prices rather than on realized returns.
Keywords: rational expectations; financial bubbles; speculation; anchoring; laboratory experiments;
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Highlights:
• We offer an interpretation of lab experiments that exhibit financial bubbles.
• We show that bubbles in controlled experiments can grow faster than exponential.
• We find traders anchor expectations more on price than on returns in these bubbles.
1 Introduction
Bubbles, defined as significant persistent deviations from fundamental value, express one of the most
paradoxical behaviors of real financial markets. Here, we analyze the dynamics of bubbles in a laboratory
market (Hommes et al. (2008)) and focus on the regimes of strong deviations from the known fundamental
values, which we refer to as the bubble regimes. Because this data is from a controlled environment,
we can exclude exogenous influences such as news or private information. We show that a model with
exponential growth, corresponding to a constant rate of returns, cannot account for the observed transient
explosive price increases. Models that incorporate positive feedback leading to faster-than-exponential
growth are found to better describe the data.
Research on financial bubbles has a rich literature (see e.g. Kaizoji and Sornette (2010) for a recent
review) aiming at explaining the origin of bubbles, their persistence and other properties. The theoretical
literature has classified different type of bubbles. For instance, Blanchard (1979) and Blanchard and
Watson (1982) introduced rational expectation (RE) bubbles, i.e., bubbles that appear in the presence
of rational investors who are willing to earn the large returns offered during the duration of the bubble as a
remuneration for the risk that the bubble ends in a crash. Tirole (1982) argued that heterogeneous beliefs
among traders is necessary for bubbles to develop. de Long et al. (1990) demonstrated that introducing
noise traders in a universe of rational speculators can amplify the size and duration of bubbles. Brock
and Hommes (1998) showed that endogenous switching between heterogeneous expectations rules, driven
by their recent relative performance, generates bubble and crash dynamics of asset prices. Abreu and
Brunnermeier (2003) explained the persistence of bubbles by the heterogeneous diagnostics of rational
agents concerning the start time of the bubble, which leads to a lack of synchronization of their shorting
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of the underlying asset, and therefore prevents them from stopping the bubble to blossom. Lux and
Sornette (2002) showed that the multiplicative stochastic process proposed by Blanchard and Watson
(1982), together with the no-arbitrage condition, predicts a tail exponent of the distribution of returns
smaller than 1, which is incompatible with empirical observations. Johansen et al. (1999) and Johansen
et al. (2000) thus extended the Blanchard-Watson (1982) model of RE bubbles by proposing models for
the crash hazard rate that exhibit critical bifurcation points reflecting the imitation and herding behavior
of the noise traders. Gallegati et al. (2011) presented a model of bubbles and crashes, where crashes
occur after a period of financial distress. Hommes (2006) reviewed behavioral models of bubbles with
fundamentalists trading against chartists.
Jarrow et al. (2007), Jarrow et al. (2010) and Jarrow et al. (2011) developed local martingale models
of bubbles within the arbitrage-free martingale pricing technology that underlies option pricing theory,
based on the assumption that bubbles come together with (or are defined by) a volatility growing faster
than linearly with the underlying price. But Andersen and Sornette (2004), among others, have shown
that some (and perhaps most) bubbles are not associated with an increase in volatility. In particular,Bates
(1991) documented that the famous worldwide October 1987 crash occurred at a minimum of the implied
volatility, at least in the US. Gu¨rkaynak (2008) surveyed econometric tests of asset price bubbles and
showed that the econometric detection of asset price bubbles cannot be achieved with a satisfactory
degree of certainty: for each paper that finds evidence of bubbles, there is another one that fits the data
equally well without allowing for a bubble.
The present paper represents the first detailed quantitative calibration of simple models with positive
feedback that unambiguously demonstrates the existence of positive feedback mechanisms and super-
exponential bubbles in the price formation process. It thus provides support within controlled laboratory
set-ups for the empirical evidence presented by Sornette et al. on historical financial bubbles (see Jiang
et al. (2010) and Kaizoji and Sornette (2010)1 and references therein for an overview).
2 Material and methods
In the experiment of Hommes et al. (2008), participants (“traders”) were asked to forecast the price of
a single asset in every turn. The price of the asset evolves with the equation,
pt =
1
1 + r
[
1
H
H∑
h=1
pht+1 + D
]
, (1)
where the market price pt at time t is given as an average of the H = 6 traders discounted price
expectations; r = 5% is the interest rate, pht+1 is the estimate of trader h for the price for period t + 1
based on information up to time t−1 and D = 3.00 is the dividend. Hence, today’s price pt is simply the
average of the current value of the traders’ expectations for tomorrow pht+1. Note that the traders have
to make a two period forecast; for their forecast pht+1, only the prices up to time t−1 are available.
Traders are given the parameters above (but not the price forming Equation 1 itself) and are rewarded
according to their prediction accuracy2. The fundamental/equilibrium price pf (which traders could
calculate) is 603. In our analysis, we focus on the realized price pt and not on the traders’ individual
estimates pht .
Notwithstanding the existence of a clearly defined market price formula, this experiment is remarkable
in reporting realized prices that are quite loosely tied to the fundamental value, because traders are
rewarded more by correctly foreseeing the other traders’ forecasts than by correctly calculating the
fundamental price pf . Moreover, traders are allowed to estimate the asset value in a large price range
between 0 and 1000 (where the upper bound is more than 16× the fundamental value pf ).
1An extended version is available at http://arxiv.org/abs/0812.2449
2The reward is proportional to the quadratic scoring rule max
{
(1300− 1300/49(pt − pht ))2, 0
}
3pf = D/r = 3.00/5% = 60
2
3 Theory/calculation
3.1 Rational Bubble
Hommes et al. (2008) discussed the rational bubble
pt = (1 + rˆ)
ta1 + b1 , (2)
where a1 is a positive constant. This process fulfills the “self-confirming” nature of rational expectations
if the assumed interest rate rˆ equals the interest rate r from Equation 1 and b1 equals the fundamental
value of pf = 604. In fact, Hommes et al. (2008) found that traders do use an interest rate rˆ significantly
larger than r in four of the six groups and hence their expectations are no longer rational (see section 4).
Furthermore, the growth rate rˆ is not constant, but is increasing as we will see later.
Todd and Gigerenzer (2000) argued that “decision-making agents in the real world must arrive at their
inferences using realistic amounts of time, information, and computational resources. [..] The most im-
portant aspects of an agent’s environment are often created by the other agents it interacts with.” More-
over, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) presented three heuristics that are employed in making judgments
under uncertainty. For our purposes, the heuristic that is relevant to interpret the groups’ behaviors is
the “adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value
is available. These heuristics are highly economical and usually effective, but they lead to systematic
and predictable errors.” (Emphasis is ours).
In the rest of this section, we are presenting two models in which traders anchor their forecasts on (1)
price or (2) return. Both models have in common that they can generate price growth that is significantly
faster than exponential (as observed in the data) and generalize the rational bubble of Equation 2.
3.2 Anchoring on Price
Generalizing the constant growth generated by Equation 2, we specify a model which allows faster or
slower than exponential growth. The growth rate log(p¯t/p¯t−1) can be explained by the excess price
p¯t−1 (which is the difference between the observed price pt and the fundamental price pf ) plus a con-
stant:
log
(
p¯t
p¯t−1
)
= a2 + b2p¯t−1. (3)
a2 > 0 and b2 > 0 would imply faster than exponential growth i.e. the growth rate grows itself. For
b2 = 0, we recover the exponential growth (equivalent to the rational bubble Equation 2 with r = rˆ).
We will see below that b2 is typically significantly larger than zero, indicating faster than exponential
growth and positive feedback on the price.
One justification for the functional form (Equation 3) is that anchoring on price is commonly used in
technical trading. One of many patterns used are support and resistance levels which is nothing else but
anchoring on price. Although in violation with the efficient markets hypothesis, Lo et al. (2000) studied
technical trading rules and found “practical value” for such technical rules.
3.3 Anchoring on Return
Alternatively, we check if the growth rate can be explained by the excess log-return log(p¯t/p¯t−1) following
the following process
log
(
p¯t+1
p¯t
)
= a3 + b3 log
(
p¯t
p¯t−1
)
. (4)
The conditions that a3 > 0 and b3 > 0 implies again faster than exponential growth of the excess price
p¯t and positive feedback from past returns. This model can be interpreted as a second order iteration or
adaptive form of the exponential growth.
4For a rational bubble, we have Et[pt+1 + D] = c(1 + r)t+1 + pf (1 + r) = (1 + r)pt.
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4 Results
In this section, we estimate the parameters of the two processes and check for the statistical significance
of b2 and b3 that express a positive feedback of price (Equation 3) or of return (Equation 4) onto future
returns. In particular, we are interested in the lower 95% confidence interval for the null hypothesis
that b2 and b3 are zero, to check for significant deviations that can confirm or not that price growth is
indeed significantly faster than exponential (which is the situation corresponding to b2 and b3 greater
than zero). As the two models can be run over a multitude of different start and end points, we present
the results in graphical form instead of tables to provide better insight.
Hommes et al. (2008) identified bubbles in five out of the six groups. Group one shows a somehow erratic
price trajectory and no bubbles. Groups five and six show some tendency towards bubbles, but the time
horizon is too short for our analysis to get significant results. Moreover, Hommes et al. (2008) found that
the bubble in group five is compatible with the hypothesis of a rational bubble (Equation 2). Hence, we
focus on group number two, three and four.
[Table 1 about here.]
4.1 Group 2
The bubble period identified by Hommes et al. (2008) runs from 7 – 26. Figure 1 shows that the
price becomes larger than the fundamental value pf at t = 7. Checking the returns vs. past returns in
Figure 2, we see that the bubble initially grows approximately exponentially (rt ≈ rt−1) as confirmed by
the positions of the points along the diagonal. Later, at around t = 14, the returns become monotonous
increasing (i.e. prices become faster than exponential growth) and are plotted above the diagonal. This
is also confirmed by Figure 3 where, for low starting and ending values of the analyzing time window, the
parameters estimated for Equation 3 are not distinguishable from exponential growth since the parameter
b2 is not significantly different from zero. However, towards the middle and the end of the bubble, the
growth rate accelerates (b2 becomes significantly larger then zero) before the bubble finally bursts. The
parameter a2 is positive over the whole analysis window (lower left panel) and almost always significantly
larger than zero (lower right panel). The upper panels shows that b2 (for low start and ending values)
is not significant different from zero, but, later in the bubble, b2 becomes positive (top left panel) and
even significant positive (upper right panel).
Checking for the existence of feedback from past returns in Figure 4, we find that Equation 4 describes
less accurately the experimental results; although the parameters a3 and b3 are both positive (left panels),
the time windows where the parameters are both significantly positive (right panels) is relatively small
(only for starting values t = 7 and t = 8).
Hence, in summary, the bubble in group 2 does not only grow significantly faster then exponential in the
end phase, but traders seem to anchor their expectations more on price rather than on return.
[Figure 1 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
[Figure 3 about here.]
[Figure 4 about here.]
4.2 Group 3
Group 3 (over the time horizon from 7 – 29) is the longest bubble among the six groups. From Figure 5
(which is plotted on log scale), the bubble seems to grow initially only exponentially (visible as a straight
line in the plot), which is also confirmed by Figure 6, which shows that the growth rate is initially
constant. At around t = 20, growth accelerates. This observation is also confirmed by the analysis of
Equation 3, where a2 is significant for almost all analysis windows. But, the positive feedback of the price
on the growth rate embodied by b2 becomes only significant in the later phase of the bubble. Analyzing
this group for the possible existence of anchoring on return (Equation 4) in Figure 8, we find that the
results are less clear cut: although a3 and b3 are positive, a3 is not significantly different form zero for
4
starting values after t = 10. Hence, we conclude that Equation 4 does not appropriately describe the
price and traders tend to anchor their expectations on price rather than on return.
[Figure 5 about here.]
[Figure 6 about here.]
[Figure 7 about here.]
[Figure 8 about here.]
4.3 Group 4
As can be seen from Figure 9, the bubble formed over the time window 7 – 29 is briefly disrupted by
the intervention of trader number 65. This can also be seen in Figure 6 where we plot the returns.
Between t = 7 and t = 13, we have more or less a cobweb and then, starting with t = 14, the growth
rate increases and a bubble is formed. For anchoring on price, we see in Figure 11 very strong evidence
for faster then exponential growth; a2 and b2 are both significantly positive. Again, for very early and
small analysis windows, only a2 is positive, indicating exponential growth in the initial phase of the
bubble. The analysis for Equation 4 in Figure 12 is less clear, but the signal for jointly positive a3 and
b3 is relatively small (only for two smallest starting values), indicating that traders prefer to anchor their
predictions on price and not on return.
[Figure 9 about here.]
[Figure 10 about here.]
[Figure 11 about here.]
[Figure 12 about here.]
5 Discussion
It is remarkable that we find many time windows where we can clearly reject the hypothesis of exponential
growth and find evidence for faster than exponential growth. This is even more remarkable when taking
into account that the data suffers some limitations which make detection of faster than exponential
growth more difficult.
Price ceiling: Although the price is allowed to fluctuate over a relatively large range, it is capped at a
maximum value of 1000. Because traders know and can anticipate this, we would expect traders
to level off their price expectation much before reaching this upper bound. This turns out not to
be the case.
Stable equilibrium price: The pricing formula Equation 1 assumes a fundamental value of 60 and
thus biases the price towards this value. Even if all traders give an estimate of 1000, the realized
market price from Equation 1 would be (1000 + 3)/1.05 ≈ 955, i.e. the price is artificially deflated
by almost 45 monetary units.
Mis-trades: There seems to be a few instances where trades’ estimates are off by an order magnitude
(i.e. some traders seem to fail to place the decimal point at the correct digit at some times).
Short data horizon: Although the experiments run over a time horizon of 50 time-steps; the bubbles
appear in much shorter time, leaving relatively few points to estimate tight confidence intervals.
Heemeijer et al. (2009) ran a comparable experiment with a slightly different price forming mechanisms
and focusing on the traders’ individual price forecasts. Further, agents’ predictions had to lie in a rela-
tively narrow range (0 – 100) allowing relatively small deviations from the fundamental price compared
to the data that we have analyzed here. In contrast to Heemeijer et al. (2009) who analyzed the data
along the dimensions of trend following, fundamentalism and obstinacy, we focus on non-linear feedback
5The prediction of trader number six at time point t = 10 seems to be off by an order of magnitude as he has misplaced
the decimal.
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of realized price and return on the price growth rate. Anufriev and Hommes (2012) have fitted a heuris-
tics switching model to a positive feedback asset pricing experiment in the presence of a fundamental
robot trader, whose trading drives the price back towards its fundamental value. As a consequence, long
lasting bubbles do not arise in that setting, but rather asset prices oscillate around the fundamental
and individuals switch between different simple forecasting heuristics such as adaptive expectations and
trend following rules.
Tirole (1982) noted that “[..] speculation relies on inconsistent plans and is ruled out by rational ex-
pectations.” However, in the experiments of Hommes et al. (2008) that we analyze here, traders are
rewarded, not on the basis of how well they predict the fundamental value of the assets they buy but
rather, on the accuracy of their prediction of the realized price itself, similarly to real financial markets.
Traders also do not need to invest their wealth into an asset, they do not worry about price fluctuations
or care about supply & demand, which lead them to “ride the bubble” (see Abreu and Brunnermeier
(2003), de Long et al. (1990) and De Long et al. (1990)). They rather give a forecast as in a Keynesian
beauty contest Keynes (1936), where traders need to synchronize their beliefs. Such self-confirming pre-
dictions can easily lead to herding, in particular in situations where the fundamental value is not directly
observable or when strong disagreement on the fundamentals between the traders occurs, such as in the
dot-com bubbles, see Shiller (2005) for instance.
6 Conclusions
There have been many reports of super-exponential behavior in financial markets in a literature inspired
by the dynamics of positive feedback leading to finite-time singularities in natural and physical systems
(see for instance Johansen and Sornette (2001) and Sornette (2004) and references therein). However,
the challenge has been and is still to confirm with more and more statistical evidence that the very noisy
financial returns do contain a significant positive feedback component during some bubbles regimes. In
the present paper, by analyzing a controlled experiments in the laboratory, we have the luxury of working
with a low noise data set. With this advantage, we have presented the first detailed quantitative calibra-
tion of simple models with positive feedback that unambiguously demonstrate the existence of positive
feedback mechanisms in the price formation process of controlled experimental financial markets.
6
Appendix
Faster than exponential growth means that there is a positive feedback loop, or as Andreassen and Kraus
(1990) noted that “[..] subjects were more likely [..] to buy as prices rose [..]”. The table down-below
illustrates the difference between constant growth and positive feedback. Note that the prices in the two
bubbles can be indistinguishable in the early phase of the bubble.
[Table 2 about here.]
[Figure 13 about here.]
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Figure 1: Price and traders’ estimate over time for group 2. Note that traders’ estimates ph are for time
t + 1 and are used to form the price pt at time t, i.e. pt = 1/H(
∑
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h
t+1 + D)/(1 + r).
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Figure 2: Next period returns rt+1 versus current returns rt for group 2. Points on the diagonal corre-
spond to constant growth (rt+1 = rt), points above the diagonal (rt+1 > rt) correspond to accelerating
growth. Note that returns are defined as discrete returns, i.e. rt+1 := (pt+1/pt)− 1.
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Figure 3: Parameter estimate of Equation 3 over the time interval [start, end] for group 2. The x-axis
corresponds to the start point and the y-axis to the end point of the analyzed time window. The bar
on the right gives the values of the parameters in color code, according to the indicated scale. aLower
and bLower correspond to the lower 95% confidence level of a2 and b2 respectively of Equation 3. Note
that b2 is around 0 for small starting and end values implying exponential growth in the initial phase of
the bubble. We observe a rather large domain in the parameter range describing the start time and end
time of the window of calibration for which the parameter b2 is positive at the 95% confidence level.
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Figure 4: Parameter estimate of Equation 4 over the time interval [time, start] for group 2. The x-axis
corresponds to the start point and the y-axis to the end point of the analyzed time window. aLower
and bLower correspond to the lower 95% confidence level for a3 and b3 respectively of Equation 4. Note
that the domain where a3 and b3 are both significantly larger than zero is restricted to the earliest two
starting points.
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Figure 5: Price and traders’ estimate over time for group 3. Same representation as Figure 1.
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Figure 6: Next period returns rt+1 versus current returns rt for group 3. Same representation as Figure 2.
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Figure 7: Parameter estimate of Equation 3 over the time interval [start, end] for group 3. Same
representation as Figure 3.
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Figure 8: Parameter estimate of Equation 4 over the time interval [time, start] for group 3. Same
representation as Figure 4.
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Figure 9: Price and traders’ estimate over time for group 4. Same representation as Figure 1.
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Figure 10: Next period returns rt+1 versus current returns rt for group 4. Same representation as
Figure 2.
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Figure 11: Parameter estimate of Equation 3 over the time interval [start, end] for group 4. Same
representation as Figure 3.
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Figure 12: Parameter estimate of Equation 4 over the time interval [time, start] for group 4. Same
representation as Figure 4.
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Group Time window Description Classification
1 NA erratic price trajectory —
2 7 – 26 speculative bubble anchoring on price
3 7 – 29 speculative bubble anchoring on price
4 7 – 21 speculative bubble anchoring on price
5 29 – 37 rational bubble —
6 23 – 29 speculative bubble (too short for analysis)
Table 1: Overview of bubbles reproduced from Hommes et al. (2008) with our own classification.
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log(p¯t/p¯t−1) = a1 log(p¯t/p¯t−1) = a2 + b2p¯t−1
t p¯t % p¯t %
0 60.00 – 60.00 –
1 66.00 10% 65.79 10%
2 72.60 10% 72.19 10%
3 79.86 10% 79.26 10%
4 87.85 10% 87.08 10%
5 96.63 10% 95.74 10%
6 106.29 10% 105.36 10%
7 116.92 10% 116.06 10%
8 128.62 10% 127.99 10%
9 141.48 10% 141.30 10%
10 155.62 10% 156.21 11%
11 171.19 10% 172.95 11%
12 188.31 10% 191.80 11%
13 207.14 10% 213.11 11%
14 227.85 10% 237.30 11%
15 250.63 10% 264.87 12%
16 275.70 10% 296.45 12%
17 303.27 10% 332.86 12%
18 333.60 10% 375.09 13%
19 366.95 10% 424.48 13%
20 403.65 10% 482.74 14%
21 444.01 10% 552.22 14%
22 488.42 10% 636.09 15%
23 537.26 10% 738.87 16%
Table 2: Table illustrating the difference between exponential growth (a1 = log(1.1) ≈ 0.095, second
column) and positive feedback by price on future returns (a2 = log(1.09) ≈ 0.086, b2 = 0.0001, fourth
column). We let the bubbles start at p¯t = 60 = 120 − 60 = pt − pf . With the parameter above,
the excess price p¯t grows initially at around 10% at each time step. In the early phase, the prices grow
approximately exponentially (the exponential growth is actually slightly faster). At time step t = 10, the
bubble with positive feedback of the price on future returns overtakes the exponential growth benchmark
and the growth rate start to accelerate.
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